Saint Mary's College of California

Saint Mary's Digital Commons
Staff Works

Scholarship, Research, Creative Activities, and
Community Engagement

2016

Governing water quality in California’s Central Coast: The case of
the conditional agricultural waiver
Ann Drevno
agd8@stmarys-ca.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.stmarys-ca.edu/staff-works
Part of the Sustainability Commons

Repository Citation
Drevno, Ann. Governing water quality in California’s Central Coast: The case of the conditional agricultural
waiver (2016). J Sci Policy Governance. 8 (1), [article]. https://digitalcommons.stmarys-ca.edu/staffworks/141

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International
License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship, Research, Creative Activities, and
Community Engagement at Saint Mary's Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Staff Works by an
authorized administrator of Saint Mary's Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@stmarys-ca.edu.

Journal of Science Policy & Governance

POLICY ANALYSIS: GOVERNING WATER QUALITY

Governing Water Quality in California’s
Central Coast: The Case of the Conditional
Agricultural Waiver
Ann Drevno1
University of California, Santa Cruz, Department of Environmental Studies
Corresponding author: agdrevno@ucsc.edu
Keywords: Environmental Policy, Water Quality, Conditional Agricultural Waiver, California, case study
1

Executive Summary: Agricultural nonpoint source pollution is a persistent environmental
and human health problem. Agriculture has impaired approximately 9,493 miles of streams
and rivers and 513,130 acres of lakes (SWRCB 2010). And in California’s Central Coast region,
water quality has deteriorated over the past decade (CCRWQCB 2011). Nonpoint source
pollution is difficult to regulate because it is inherently diffuse: monitoring dispersed and
dynamic discharges and connecting them back to their sources to identify what operation is
polluting and to what extent is both expensive and complex. Despite these obstacles,
policymakers are increasingly forced to tackle the monumental task of how to best regulate
agricultural discharges.
This case study focuses on the primary water pollution control policy in one of California’s
highest valued agricultural areas: the Central Coast Conditional Agricultural Waiver (Ag
Waiver). The Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board (Regional Board), which is
granted authority from the State Water Resources Control Board (State Board) for protecting
and restoring water quality within its jurisdiction, is under pressure, especially in light of a
2015 Superior Court ruling that directed the Regional Board to implement more stringent
control measures for agricultural water pollution. Pressure on the Regional Board is
exacerbated by regulatory budget constraints, interest groups, and by unanticipated events.
This study assesses the factors that influenced the development and implementation of the
Ag Waiver policy process over the last decade and evaluates specific policy outcomes from
this process. Results indicate that several complicated factors either drive or constrain
improved water quality management and pollution control. In California’s Central Coast,
conditions that have weakened agricultural water pollution policies in the region include
budgetary and staff constraints, the 2006 E. coli breakout, and the powerful agricultural lobby.
On the other side, environmentalists, environmental justice groups, health organizations,
scientific studies, S.B. 390, and the 2015 California Superior Court ruling have pushed the
Regional Board to develop more comprehensive water quality protections.
The 2004 and 2012 Ag Waivers mark a significant step forward in water quality protections,
but have fallen short of achieving water quality objectives. Several provisions could be
strengthened or modified to better meet these goals, including: a more comprehensive
monitoring and reporting program, enforcement of science-based management practices to
control pollution at its source, and the development of strategies to increase the participation
and cooperation with the regulated industry.

www.sciencepolicyjournal.org
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I. Introduction
Nonpoint source pollution, or pollution that
comes from many diffuse sources, continues to
contaminate California’s waters (SWRCB 2010).
Agricultural nonpoint source pollution is the
primary source of pollution in the state: Agriculture
has impaired approximately 9,493 miles of streams
and rivers and 513,130 acres of lakes on the 303(d)
list of waterbodies statewide (SWRCB 2010). The
303(d) list is a section of the Clean Water Act
mandating states and regions to review and report
waterbodies and pollutants that exceed protective
water quality standards. Agricultural pollution in
California’s Central Coast has detrimentally affected
aquatic life, including endemic fish populations and
sea otters, the health of streams, and human sources
of drinking water (Anderson et al. 2003, Anderson et
al. 2006, Shimek, 2012a, Harter et al. 2012). Despite
the growing evidence of agriculture’s considerable
contribution to water pollution, the agricultural
industry has, in effect, been exempt from paying for
their pollution, and more importantly, has failed to
meet water quality standards. How to best manage
and regulate nonpoint source agricultural water
pollution remains a primary concern for
policymakers and agricultural operators alike.
This case study focuses on the Conditional
Agricultural Waiver in California’s Central Coast, the
primary water pollution control policy in one of the
highest valued agricultural areas in the U.S. The
Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board
is under increasing pressure to improve water
quality within its jurisdiction, especially with the
added onus from a 2015 Superior Court ruling that
directed the Regional Board to implement more
stringent control measures for agricultural water
pollution. Pressure on the Regional Board is
exacerbated by regulatory budget constraints,
interest groups, and by unanticipated events. Given
these pressures, choosing appropriate criteria by
which to evaluate the success of California’s primary
agricultural water quality policies is complicated,
but of critical importance.
This policy analysis explores the complex process
of negotiations, agendas and conditions at the heart
of policy-making, highlighting areas where the 2004
and 2012 Ag Waiver has succeeded in achieving its
goals, as well as where it has fallen short. The
analysis is divided into two parts. The first employs
a within-case method of process tracing to assess the
www.sciencepolicyjournal.org
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factors that acted as drivers or limitations to the
policy process. Part two, uses six evaluative criteria
to assess the effectiveness of specific outcomes, such
as water quality improvements and the value of
monitoring data.
II. Regulatory Background
The 1972 Clean Water Act employs a technologybased standards approach, whereby any discharger
must obtain a permit (valid for five years) that
contains the limits on what an individual or industry
can discharge into a given water body as well as
details their monitoring and reporting requirements,
all these provisions are defined and enforced by the
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NDPES) permit system (CWA § 402). This approach
aims to control pollutants at the point of discharge
by setting uniform discharge limitations based on
the best available technology pertaining to a
particular industrial category. The U.S. EPA grants
states the primary responsibility of issuing NPDES
permits, and monitoring and enforcing performance.
When the technology-based approach does not
adequately control pollution, an additional control
tool, water quality-based standards, is implemented.
The EPA and states use a calculation, Total
Maximum Daily Load (TMDL), to determine the
maximum amount of a pollutant that a waterbody
can receive while still meeting water quality
standards. Water quality standards are set by
designating a “beneficial use” (i.e., fishing, swimming,
drinking) for each waterbody as well as the criteria
to protect the designated use of that water. The
TMDL calculation is a multi-step process: first, the
state lists each impaired waterbody within its
jurisdiction, called the “303(d) list”; second, using
the state’s already-established “beneficial use”
categories, a numeric TMDL is calculated for each
waterbody; finally, a portion of the load is allocated
to each discharger.
The fundamental problem of TMDLs, especially in
waters polluted with nonpoint sources, is that they
must be translated into specific numeric discharge
limitations for each source of pollution (Houck
1999). Because nonpoint source pollution (NPS),
such as agricultural runoff, is inherently diffuse, the
task of monitoring dispersed and dynamic
discharges and connecting them back to their
sources to identify what operation is polluting and to
what extent is both expensive and complicated.
JSPG. Vol. 8, Issue 1, February 2016
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However, efforts by the EPA are underway to make
water quality modeling, specifically targeted at
regulators implementing TMDLs and water quality
standards, more easily accessible and affordable
(EPA 2015).
Similar to the Clean Water Act, California’s
Porter-Cologne Act gives broad authority to nine
Regional Water Quality Control Boards (“Regional
Boards”) to regulate water quality at a sub-state,
localized scale. Regional Boards are responsible for
water quality protection, permitting, inspection, and
enforcement actions (Water Code §13225(a)). Any
discharger that could affect water quality must
obtain a permit to pollute (“Waste Discharge
Requirement,” which is similar to a NPDES permit).
The Regional Board issues permits on the condition
that beneficial uses are protected and water quality
objectives will be met. The Regional Boards also
have the right to waive Waste Discharge
Requirements (WDRs) for individuals or groups,
including agriculture, if it is in the public interest
(Water Code §13269). For agricultural discharges,
Regional Boards have historically granted waivers
rather than force growers to comply with WDRs. In
October of 1999, with water quality high on the
political agenda, Senate Bill 390 (S.B. 390) was
passed, mandating that Regional Boards attach
conditions to waivers and review them every five
years (called “Conditional Waivers of Waste
Discharge Requirements” or “Conditional Waivers”).
All waivers need to include monitoring
requirements for discharges that pose a risk to
water quality. Such monitoring requirements must
be adequate to verify the effectiveness of the
Waiver’s conditions (Monterey Coastkeeper, et al. v.
SWRCB 2015). In effect, the Conditional Waivers
function similarly to Waste Discharge Requirements:
the discharger needs to meet conditions specified in
the Waiver/Permit.
Each Regional Board has taken a different
approach to controlling runoff from agricultural
lands within their jurisdiction (Newman 2012), but
almost all have issued Conditional Waivers. In 2004,
the Central Coast Region (Region 3) was the first to
adopt a Conditional Agricultural Waiver (“Ag
Waiver”). The conditions attached to the 2004
Waiver required growers to enroll in the
Agricultural Waiver program, complete 15 hours of
water quality education, prepare a farm plan,
implement water quality improvement practices,
and complete individual or cooperative water
www.sciencepolicyjournal.org
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quality monitoring. The 2004 Agricultural Waiver
expired in July 2009, but the Order was extended
five times from 2009 until 2012.
After nearly three years of continued negotiation,
on March 15, 2012 the Central Coast Regional Board
adopted a new Conditional Agricultural Waiver,
Order No. R3-2012-0011. The updated 2012 Ag
Waiver places farms in one of three tiers, based on
their risk to water quality (Tier 1 being the lowest
risk and Tier 3 the highest). Bigger and more
polluting farms are held to tougher standards. For
most of the Tier 1 and 2 farms, the 2012
requirements are similar to those in the 2004
Waiver: water quality education, water quality
management plans, implementation of management
practices, and either cooperative or independent
surface receiving water monitoring and reporting.
For Tier 3 farms (or a subset of Tier 3 Farms) and a
subset of Tier 2 farms, additional conditions are
added, including submitting an annual compliance
form, conducting individual discharge monitoring
and reporting, and implementing vegetative buffers.
Soon after the 2012 adoption, the State Board
received petitions from five parties, representing
both the agricultural community and environmental
organizations, requesting a “stay” (deferral) on
specific provisions of the new waiver.
The
agricultural community argued that the Ag Waiver
was too harsh, and environmentalists contended it
did not go far enough (CCRWQCB, 2012). The State
Board asked the Central Coast Regional Board to
review and estimate the costs of the provisions of
concern and further explain the environmental and
public benefits that the updated Waiver would
accrue from compliance (SWRCB 2013). The State
Board rewrote sections of the Agricultural Waiver,
and released a final version in September 2013.
Unsatisfied with the State Board’s revisions, a
coalition of environmental groups, together with an
elderly woman who could not drink water from her
tap because it was contaminated with agricultural
waste, filed a lawsuit in Sacramento’s Superior Court
challenging the 2012 Central Coast Agricultural
Waiver and the changes made by the State Board.
The coalition claimed the State Board changes
“cripple the already weak order,” and as it’s
currently written, the Ag Waiver is “so weak, it did
not comply with state law” (Otter Project 2015). In
his ruling on August 11, 2015, Superior Court Judge
Frawley agreed that the Central Coast’s Conditional
Agricultural Waiver was doing an inadequate job of
JSPG. Vol. 8, Issue 1, February 2016
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protecting regional water quality and needed to
develop more stringent conditions.
III. Research Justification
A more contextualized story of adopting the 2004
and 2012 Ag Waivers is laden with complex and
contentious trade-offs, negotiations, lobbying efforts,
alliance building, scientific findings, and difficult to
foresee “focusing events” (see Kingdon 1995). The
aim of this research is to use research-driven
evidence to assess the Ag Waiver policy process and
outcomes. This study pays special attention to
assessing the effectiveness of the monitoring
program and significance of data collected under the
Conditional Agricultural Waiver. Monitoring data is
arguably the most pressing concern for nonpoint
source pollution control plans. This Central Coast
case illustrates a common trend in nonpoint source
(NPS) pollution control and what Sunstein (1990)
would mark as “regulatory failure due to
information limitation.” The current monitoring
data on agricultural water discharges are inadequate
to allocate TMDLs and therefore implement and
enforce water quality standards. In the absence of
sufficient data, the Ag Waiver regulatory program
cannot comply with state and federal law, and water
protections are further delayed (Wittemore and Ice
2001). In an attempt to comply with water quality
standards, the Central Coast Regional Board has
endeavored to ratchet up monitoring efforts. For
example, the updated 2012 Agricultural Waiver
program modestly expanded the amount of
information it requires of Tier 3 growers to include
some individual monitoring. Unfortunately, many
are skeptical that this more “robust” monitoring
program will, in practice, amount to much more in
terms of useful information than the previous
(2004) monitoring program, especially given the
small number of growers in Tier 3. This study fills a
gap in research on where monitoring efforts have
succeeded and failed in the Central Coast’s
agricultural NPS pollution control policies and in
reaching TMDL goals.
There is also a growing need to identify realistic
tools for water quality agencies charged with the
difficult task of regulating agricultural NPS pollution.
While this study will tailor recommendations
specifically to the Central Coast Region, other states
and localities facing similar difficulties can utilize
results from this research to better manage
agricultural pollution with their jurisdiction.
www.sciencepolicyjournal.org

Figure 1. The Central Coast Region
IV. Case Study Selection
The Central Coast Region (Figure 1) stretches 300
miles from San Mateo County in the north to Santa
Barbara County in the south, and is composed of
17,000 miles of streams and rivers and 4,000 square
miles of groundwater basins. The 2010 Surface
Water Ambient Monitoring program report found
that the Central Coast had the highest percentage of
highly toxic waters in the state, of all sites samples,
22% were considered “highly toxic” (i.e., the mean
for all samples from the site was more toxic than the
high toxicity threshold) (Anderson et al. 2010). The
topography is defined by several coastal mountain
ranges including the Santa Lucia Range, closest to
the coast, the Gabilan and Diablo ranges in the north,
the Cholame Hills in the center and La Panza ranges
in the south (DWR 2009). Three major valleys are
nestled among mountain ranges. They are, in order
of size: the long Salinas Valley, stretching 120 miles
from Moss Landing to Santa Margarita and two
smaller valleys, the Pajaro Valley in the north
adjacent to the Salinas, and the Santa Maria Valley in
the south.
The Central Coast Region covers approximately
435,000 acres of irrigated land (44.5% of statewide
agricultural acreage) and approximately 3,000
agricultural operations. These operations produce a
variety of specialty products such as lettuce,
JSPG. Vol. 8, Issue 1, February 2016
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strawberries, raspberries, artichokes, asparagus,
broccoli, carrots, cauliflower, celery, and herbs (EDD
2012). While several microclimates exist, overall the
region has a temperate, Mediterranean climate
characterized by mild, wet winters, and warm, dry
summers (DWR 2009).
V. Methods
Both analyses will use a within-case method of
“process tracing,” also called “historical analysis” or
“detailed case studies” (King, Keohane, and Verba
1994) to assess the factors that acted as drivers or
limitations to developing the 2004 and 2012 Ag
Waiver. Using in-depth qualitative methods and
focusing on the single case of the Central Coast
Region allows numerous variables and conditions to
be explored to see which ones “activate” a particular
outcome (George and Bennett 2005). The goal of this
process is to tease out which causal factors—be they
part of the policy process or mechanisms embedded
in the policy tool itself—contributed to the
development of the 2004 and 2012 Agricultural
Waiver. This strategy utilizes variation in the
dependent and independent variables, an approach
that has been successfully employed in social science
research (George and Bennett 2005).
Though a general causal hypothesis can be made
that certain independent variables (factors within
the policy and implementation process, such as
budgetary and staff constraints) have a causal effect
on policy-making, process tracing allows the
researcher to narrow down the list of potential
influential causes as well as uncover independent
variables that otherwise would have been left out
(George and Bennett 2005). Process tracing can also
identify whether or not these influential variables
have a positive or negative effect on the policy
outcome. Such a research design is as an iterative,
cyclical process—a broad hypothesis can be refined
as more data are gathered. King, Keohane, and
Verba (1994) explain that this type of “exploratory
investigation”—selecting on the basis of variance in
dependent and independent variables—generates a
more precise hypothesis than that which can be
made at the beginning.
Process tracing requires an in-depth understanding
of causal mechanisms in the policymaking process in
each case, relying on data from newspapers and
magazine articles, websites, meeting minutes, policy
documents, government reports, public comments,
monitoring and enforcement data, and other
www.sciencepolicyjournal.org
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archival documents. Key informants for this part of
the current research include Regional Water Board
staff, university extension specialists, agricultural
organizations, growers, water quality agencies, and
stakeholders involved in water quality efforts.
Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured
manner and key informants were identified using
“snowball” sampling—starting with a few identified
stakeholders who then share names of additional
significant individuals to interview. In this study,
data from interviews are used help contextualize
events, perspectives, language or definitions and
reaffirm information identified during the document
analysis.
VI. Policy Analysis Part 1: Forces Driving and
Impeding Policy
A staff member at the Regional Board described why
agricultural water pollution became a priority in the
region: “what is different about the Central Coast
Region [compared to other Regions], is that there is
a real problem with drinking water here. It was the
choice of a few people acknowledging that ‘this is a
problem’ and it was time to move forward with
more enforcements” (Interview with Regional Board
staffer, October 3, 2012). At the same time, political
alliances were being forged between unlikely
interests groups (e.g., the Farm Bureau and
environmentalists) and water quality was becoming
a statewide concern. According to a UC Extension
advisor, during the first 2004 Ag Waiver process,
participation and cooperation amongst the
agricultural community helped move the regulatory
process along:
Recognizing the problem was not going to fade, the
Farm Bureau decided to jump on [the water quality
issue] when it first started. The [Farm] Bureau
became instrumental in calming [the growers] down.
They decided to be pro-active and work with others
to convince the farming community that [water
quality control measures] were worth investing in.
(Interview with UC Extension agent, February 4,
2013).
With the escalating momentum and the further
impetus from S.B. 390, the 2004 Agricultural Waiver
was passed by the Regional Board, marking a small
but critical step forward in regional agricultural
water quality protections. The conditions attached
to the 2004 Waiver (described above) were
palatable to growers yet significant enough to
initiate a regulatory program, with the underlying
JSPG. Vol. 8, Issue 1, February 2016
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assumption that future Ag Waivers would gradually
increase requirements if water quality did not
improve.
Just as water quality was rising on the agenda,
circumstances changed and priorities shifted. In
September 2006, two years after passing the first
Agricultural Waiver, an E. coli outbreak traced to the
Salinas Valley killed three people and sickened more
than 200 (Stuart et al. 2006). Due to public concern,
large supermarket chains including Safeway and
Costco Wholesale Corporation, demanded that
growers have more stringent food safety
requirements (Stuart et al. 2006). The E. coli sources
of highest concern were from animals passing
through crop fields. Subsequently, food safety
auditors began requiring a “scorched-earth” policy
including minimizing any vegetative habitat around
farms that could attract wildlife. One farmer stated
that the “Western Growers Association said they
wouldn’t buy anything from farms with vegetative
buffer strips.” Because maintaining vegetation on a
field’s edge protects water quality from discharging
into nearby waterbodies, calling for its removal
could threaten efforts to address water pollution on
the Central Coast (Stuart et al. 2006). The E. coli
“focusing event” (see Kingdon 2003) forced the
Regional Board to rethink this key provision
(vegetative buffer strips), which was already under
discussion in drafts of the updated Agricultural
Waiver. Mandating vegetative buffer strips for all
farms would, quite literally, compete with food
safety requirements, which require farms to clear
vegetation.
The
contradictory
food
safety
requirement (remove vegetative buffers) versus
water quality requirement (install vegetative
buffers) left growers confused about which policies
to follow. A representative from the Farm Bureau
voiced frustration on behalf of the agricultural
community, “ever since E. coli there has been a
series of complex overlay of regulations” (Interview
with Farm Bureau representative, February, 2013).
Two additional issues related to buffer
implementation concerned growers: the cost and the
science driving the policy. Growers worried about
the price not only of installing, irrigating and
maintaining the new vegetation around their farms,
but also the lost revenue from taking cropland out of
production and replacing it with vegetation.
Moreover, some agricultural stakeholders contended
that the science driving this mandate was
inadequate. The improved water quality from
www.sciencepolicyjournal.org
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vegetative buffers, including pollutant, nutrient and
sediment retention, infiltration, sediment deposition,
and absorption are well documented in the
literature (see Arora et al. 2010, Mayer et al. 2007,
Balestrini 2011). However, regional agronomic
research demonstrating the effectiveness of
vegetative buffers is limited to only a few studies,
and their results are mixed, especially in regards to
the most effective width-size and vegetation (Los
Huertos 1999, Rein 1999). Buffer width became a
cornerstone of debate since the jury was still out on
exactly how wide a buffer should be to improve
water quality. The results of a meta-analysis of over
80 scientific articles on vegetated buffers and
sediment trapping efficacy concluded that while
wider buffers provide a longer “residence” time for
runoff water and thus, are more effective in reducing
sediment, sediment trapping efficacy does not
improve significantly when buffer width was
increased beyond 10 meters (Liu et al. 2007). In
other words, beyond 10 meters, the law of
diminishing returns takes effect. The analysis by Liu
and colleagues also concludes that buffer width
alone only explains about one-third of retention
effectiveness, and other factors, such as soil, slope
and vegetation play an equally important role.
Because of these competing interests, the vegetative
buffer requirement was substantially weakened
throughout the Agricultural Waiver deliberation
process. The 2010 Draft Waiver proposed that all
farms should be required to implement a 50-100foot buffer; by November of that year the mandate
was reduced to only Tier 3 farms and the buffer
width was reduced to 30 feet, and by the final 2012
Waiver the buffer requirement was left largely to the
discretion of the agricultural operator, stating that
either a buffer or a proposed alternative must be
implemented to protect adjacent polluted
waterbodies.
With the E. coli event still fresh on the public’s minds,
water quality temporarily faded from the regulatory
spotlight. But not for long: the 2004 Ag Waiver was
due to expire in July 2009, forcing the Regional
Board staff to launch a new stakeholder process for
the updated Ag Waiver. Unfortunately, the proposed
public input process was deemed “not transparent
or open to the public” by a California Farm Bureau
representative, and did not keep pace with the 2009
deadline. The Waiver was extended for another year.
In addition to the pending deadline, mounting
scientific evidence of water pollution sources and
JSPG. Vol. 8, Issue 1, February 2016
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mobilization of several interest groups pushed
agricultural water pollution back on the agenda.
Water quality data collected over the preceding five
years from the 2004 Ag Waiver Cooperative
Monitoring Program clearly showed discharges from
agricultural lands were a cause of pesticide toxicity
as well as a contributing source of nitrate and
sediment impairments in the region (CCRWQCB
2012). Due to growing concerns about one
contaminate in particular, nitrate, a 2008 Senate Bill
(S.B. X2-1) was passed, requiring the State Water
Resource Control Board to prepare a report
addressing nitrate groundwater contamination. The
Center for Watershed Sciences at the University of
California, Davis conducted the report, and one of
the watersheds they chose to study (because of
known nitrate-contamination) was in the Central
Coast region. Additionally, the 2010 State Water
Resource Control Board Report found that the
Central Coast Region had the highest percentage of
toxic water sites statewide. Furthermore, several
scientific reports found that pesticide use in the
Central Coast was contributing to water column and
sediment toxicity (Anderson et al. 2003), as well as
cause
human
health
problems,
such
as
developmental delays in infants and children
(Perera et al. 2006).
The Regional Board staff had the scientific evidence
and momentum it needed to develop an ambitious
2010 Draft Waiver. Among the many sweeping
reforms, the 2010 Draft Waiver required all
discharges to conduct individual surface water
discharge monitoring, required Farm Plans to be
accompanied by monitoring and site evaluation
results, prohibited the use of excess fertilizer,
required a comprehensive list of pesticides to be
regulated, and required all farms to implement
vegetative buffers. Members of the agricultural
community voiced their concerns with the Draft in
Regional Water Board meetings, through comment
letters, on the web, and in newspapers. In a
December 2009 meeting, several agricultural
representatives reiterated their frustrations about
the public input process, their worries regarding the
mounting costs, and their opinions that the existing
2004 Ag Waiver was working well and did not need
to be amended. Environmentalists, on the other
hand, believed the proposed Order should be
adopted without further delay. At a standstill, the
Board re-issued the existing Conditional Waiver four

www.sciencepolicyjournal.org
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more times: November 2010, March 2011, July 2011,
and August 2011.
Environmental groups, with agendas ranging from
environmental justice to marine ecosystem
protections to urban stormwater programs, were
highly disappointed that the 2010 Draft Waiver was
not adopted. The environmental community was
strongly represented by the Santa Barbara
Channelkeeper, The Otter Project, and Monterey Bay
Keeper, providing extensive comments at Regional
Board meetings up until the adoption of the 2012
Agricultural Order.
In 2012, published results from the State
commissioned nitrate contamination study, although
controversial among the agricultural community,
found that cropland was the primary source (96%)
of human-generated nitrate contamination in the
Tulare Lake Basin and the Salinas Valley (located in
the Central Coast), and that 254,000 people in the
area are at risk for nitrate contamination in their
drinking water. Because nitrate-contaminated
drinking water is a well-known human health effects,
including “blue baby syndrome” (Knobeloch et al.
2000), the results of this study became a rallying-cry
for the Department of Health to encourage a more
stringent Agricultural Waiver.
The California Department of Health shed light on
nitrate groundwater contamination, echoing
concerns reported from the UC Davis report. The
United Farm Workers and a coalition of groups
rallied behind environmental justice concerns,
representing the voice of people most affected by
nitrate contaminated drinking water. At a Central
Coast Board meeting in February of 2012, Marcela
Morales of the Central Coast Alliance United for a
Sustainable Economy explained that contaminated
water is disproportionately impacting low-income
populations and people of color. She strongly urged
the Board to take action and not delay the updated
Waiver, claiming that communities affected by
drinking water contamination are in urgent need of
basic protection to ensure clean drinking water.
Another impetus arose from water quality
regulators in urban areas. Municipalities, facing
ever-stringent regulations, began to question the
fairness of waiving the agricultural water quality
requirements (Meurer 2011). City managers voiced
their concern about pollutants from agricultural
areas being deposited into receiving waterbodies
within city boundaries, which cities are required to
clean up through stormwater National Pollutant
JSPG. Vol. 8, Issue 1, February 2016
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Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits. As
the City Manager of Monterey, for example,
suggested that agricultural industries and
municipalities should be held to the same standard
(Meurer 2011).
On the other side, Farm Bureaus, individual growers
and the Growers and Shippers Association
represented the agricultural interests. California’s
$43.5 billion agriculture industry comprised of
81,500 farms spread over 25.4 million acres is one of
the largest and most influential interest groups in
the state (USDA 2011). Historically, the California
Farm Bureau has had success at regional and
national lobbying efforts. Between the two
Agricultural Waivers (2004 and 2012), there were
grumblings amongst the agricultural community
that the Regional Board was not involving the
growers in the deliberation process as much as
during the 2004 Ag Waiver negotiations. As one
farm stakeholder explained, growers felt they were
not involved when figuring out solutions to water
quality improvements, rather “[the Regional Board]
set the rules without much input and expected
growers to comply.” As a lettuce grower in the
Salinas Valley stated, “the Regional Board didn’t take
into account stakeholder opinion...The elephant in
the room...[was] that there was no collaboration
between the grower community and the regional
water board staff... Discussions about the
[Agricultural Waiver] and how to implement it
should have been happening during the past four
years, but it did not” (as cited in Campbell, 2012).
Several board meetings leading up to the March vote
were packed with testimonies from agricultural
interests assembling to delay the vote and water
quality interest groups, encouraging the Board to
pass a more stringent updated Agricultural Waiver.
Steve
Shimek
(2012b),
spearheading
the
environmental interests, described the dualistic
nature of the unfolding politics: “on one side are
community activists seeking tougher pollution limits
and public access to water quality data. On the other
side are too many farmers trying to avoid cleaning
up the waste from their operations.” At the March 15,
2012 Board meeting, the three-year long debate
culminated in the passage of an updated Agricultural
Waiver.
But the process was not over. As mentioned
earlier, five groups requested a deferral on several
provisions of the 2012 Ag Waiver. In September of
2013 the State Board adopted the existing Ag Waiver,
www.sciencepolicyjournal.org
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which made some modifications to the 2012 version
passed by the Regional Board. A few months later,
environmentalists filed a lawsuit in Sacramento
Superior Court challenging the modified 2012 Ag
Waiver as being too weak. The modified waiver and
lawsuit will be discussed in more detail in the next
section.
Overall, the policy process leading up to the 2012
Ag Waiver was fraught with tension between a
variety of stakeholders, including agriculture, cities,
environmentalists, scientists and environmental
justice groups. Consequently, the Waiver that
ultimately passed was more robust than its 2004
predecessor, but weaker than ambitious draft orders
that came to the fore during negotiations (e.g., 2010).
The next part of this paper will analyze the
effectiveness of the resultant provisions embedded
in both Ag Waivers.
VII. Policy Analysis Part 2: Policy Outcomes
Public policy literature presents several means to
assess the efficacy of a policy. The criteria chosen
for policy analysis is important, as it could influence
the direction of the policy as well as future budget
allocations.
Cass Sunstein (1990), former
Administrator of White House Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs for the Obama administration,
asserts that determining the success or failure of a
regulation depends on its goals and scope. Dowd and
his colleagues (2008) echo this claim in their paper
on agricultural nonpoint source pollution policy in
the Central Coast, stressing that the success of the
Agricultural Waiver largely depends on the
evaluative criteria used. Six parameters were
carefully selected to measure the effectiveness of the
2004 and 2012 Ag Waivers: 1) complying with
mandates set in the Agricultural Waiver, 2)
evaluating quantifiable water quality improvements,
3) evaluating the requirements themselves, 4)
assessing the significance of monitoring data, 5)
comparing costs to growers vs. broader societal and
environmental benefits, and 6) evaluating the equity
of compliance across growers, including the
distributive consequences.
Embedded evaluative criteria in the Agriculture
Waiver
A logical place to begin evaluating the success of the
2004 and 2012 Agricultural Waiver is by measuring
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Table 1. Ag Waiver Requirements - Summary of Program Compliance (2014)
Tier
Requirement
Level
Required
Failed to In compliance
Non-compliance (%)
to Comply Comply
(%)
1 2 3
✓ ✓ ✓ Enroll – File eNOI
Farm Acres
435,000
25,540
94%
6%
✓ ✓ ✓ Develop/Update Farm Plan
Operation
1,796
288
84%
16%
✓ ✓ ✓ Install Backflow Prevention Farm
3,093
104
97%
3%
Device
✓ ✓ ✓ Update electronic eNOI
Farm
4,322
933
77%
23%
✓ ✓ ✓ Surface receiving water
Operation
1,775
147
92%
8%
monitoring (cooperative)
✓ ✓ ✓ Surface receiving water
Operation
21
0
0%
100%
monitoring (individual)
✓ ✓ ✓ Groundwater monitoring
Farm
1,861
Pending
(cooperative)
✓ ✓ ✓ Groundwater monitoring
Drinking
876
225
74%
26%
(individual)
Agriculture
1,657
410
75%
25%
✓ ✓ Submit Annual Compliance Farm
2,168
245
89%
11%
Form
✓ ✓ Calculate risk of nitrate
Farm
2,168
245
89%
11%
loading to groundwater
✓ ✓ Record and report total
Farm
467
0
100%
0%
nitrogen applied
✓ Report individual discharge Farm
14
0
100%
0%
monitoring

Source: Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board, 2015
the degree to which growers met the compliance
requirements. Based on the high level of enrollment
in the 2004 Agricultural Waiver (1,800 operations,
who manage 93% of the total regional acreage) the
2004 Waiver has been labeled a success by simple
participation among growers. The number that
completed The 2012 Ag Order boasts roughly the
same enrollment numbers: 1,796 operations
managing 94% of farm acreage in the region.
Evaluating compliance based on specific 2012
requirements, however, is more variable (See Table
1). As Table 1 indicates, there is a high compliance
rate for simply enrolling in the program, but slightly
less so in regards to more complex requirements.
For example, close to a quarter of all farms have not
reported groundwater monitoring at the individual
level for both domestic drinking water and
agricultural wells. On the other hand, every farm
(100% compliance rate) that is required to report
total nitrogen applied to their farm has done so.
Water quality improvements
Despite high compliance rates, the Ag Waiver has
resulted in uncertain water quality gains. A number
www.sciencepolicyjournal.org

of water quality monitoring programs can be used to
determine whether regional waterbodies are getting
cleaner or more degraded since the implementation
of the Ag Waivers. This assessment summarizes a
subset of relevant water quality databases, reports,
and scientific studies (see Table 2).
The Clean Water Act Section 303(d) list1 of Impaired
Waterbodies for the Central Coast Region can be an
indication, albeit a limited one, of how water quality
has changed over time. Two relevant listing cycles,
2006 and 2010, indicate a dramatic increase in the
number of polluted waterways in the Central Coast.
Over these four years, Regional Board staff added
515 listings of impaired waterbodies, totaling 707 in
the 2010 listing cycle (CCRWQCB 2009). Agriculture
is a source of impairment in the majority of these
listed waterbodies. While these numbers are striking,
The “303(d) list” is short for the list of impaired
and threatened waters that the Clean Water Act
requires all states to submit for EPA approval every
two years. The states identify all water where
required pollution controls are not sufficient to
attain water quality standards.

1
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Table 2. Water quality data sources
Agency
Program

life, and agricultural uses. Of these concerns, nitrate
contamination is the most serious and widespread
problem in the region.
Regional water quality reflects a larger state and
national trend of degrading and variable water
conditions. California Water Boards’ Annual
Performance Report (2010-2011) found half of all
surveyed streams in the state to be degraded or very
degraded, as measured by the health of aquatic
organism communities that live in the state’s
streams. The bioassessment studies show a clear
relationship between increased water pollution and
increased agricultural and urban land use
(Worcester
2011).
Agriculture
impairs
approximately 9,493 miles of streams and rivers and
513,130 acres of lakes on the 303(d) list of
waterbodies statewide (SWRCB 2010).
Nationwide, agricultural nonpoint pollution is the
chief impediment to achieving national water quality
objectives (EPA 2010). The EPA lists the chief
components of these nonpoint source agricultural
pollutants as nitrogen and phosphorus from
fertilizers, pesticides, animal sources, soil erosion,
and salts from irrigated fields. The National Rivers
and Streams Assessment, conducted by the U.S EPA
in 2004 and again in 2008/9, uses separate
monitoring data from the 303(d) listings. Over the
course of five years, between 2004 and 2009, the
Assessment found seven percent fewer stream miles
were in good biological condition. Similar to the
Central Coast, throughout the U.S. changes to water
quality in streams were variable over time and space.
Overall, the report found that U.S. streams and rivers
are “under significant stress and more than half
exhibit poor biological condition” (EPA 2009).
Despite the diverse datasets, frequency and
consistency of monitoring data is still not sufficient
to verify the effectiveness (measured by improved
water quality) of the Agricultural Waiver (Monterey
Coastkeeper, et al. v. SWRCB 2015, Worcester 2011).
The following two sections will assess the value of
the Ag Waivers requirements, particularly the
monitoring provisions.

Preservation Inc.
Surface Water Ambient
Monitoring Program
(Regional Boards)
Coastal Watershed Council
U.S. EPA
U.S. EPA
Peer-reviewed scientific
studies

Cooperative Monitoring
Program (CMP)
Central Coast Ambient
Monitoring Program
(CCAMP)
Snapshot Day/ First Flush
CWA 303(d) List of
Impaired Waterbodies
Rivers and National Streams
Assessments

Granite Canyon Lab (See
work by Anderson, B.S.,
Hunt, B.M., and Phillips,
P.A.)

trends using these data should be made with caution
for at least two reasons: 1) the number of
waterbodies assessed for the 303(d) list varies from
year-to-year and 2) there may be a latency period
between when a waterbody was surveyed and when
it is listed.
The most commonly cited monitoring databases
used to assess water quality in the region (CCAMP
and CMP) also indicate degrading water quality.
Reports from these two agencies suggest that many
of the same waterbodies, especially in the two areas
responsible for most water pollution, are more
polluted than they were a decade ago (CCRWQCB
2011). While some waters have improved—47
waterbodies were de-listed as impaired in 2010—
the vast majority have not. The lower Salinas
watershed and the lower Santa Maria area are
responsible for most of the region’s polluted waters;
these areas are also the leading agricultural
producers in the Central Coast (CCRWQCB, 2011).
The 303(d) list, CMP, CCAMP, CWC, and scientific
studies from the UC Davis Marine Pollution Studies
Laboratory at Granite Canyon, identify a number of
water quality concerns, in particular, dissolved
oxygen, elevated pH, elevated nitrate and ammonia,
water and sediment toxicity, and habitat
disturbances. Monitoring patterns show that these
pollution parameters are variable throughout the
region, and that particular watersheds are hotspots
for certain pollutants. When listed together, these
parameters are responsible for impairments to the
beneficial uses of drinking water, recreation, aquatic
www.sciencepolicyjournal.org

A Closer look at the Ag Waiver Requirements
A closer look at the requirements themselves
highlights why compliance may not lead to improved
water quality. The Agricultural Waiver, in theory,
uses an approach that gradually increases
compliance requirements, called an “iterative
approach,”
meaning
dischargers
implement
JSPG. Vol. 8, Issue 1, February 2016
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increasingly improved management practices until
the region has achieved clean water. This approach
recognizes that progress towards achieving water
standards can take time. Logically, the 2012 Waiver
should be significantly more rigorous than its
predecessor. While Tier 3 farms might have more
stringent requirements, a handful of significant
provisions for Tier 1 and 2, which make up 99% of
all growers, have been so watered-down and in
some cases eliminated that the 2012 Ag Waiver has
been regarded as “only marginally stronger than the
2004 Ag Waiver” (Monterey Coastkeeper, et al. v.
SWRCB 2015).
Several examples illustrate this point. First, in its
modifications to the 2012 Agricultural Waiver, the
State Board eliminated the only enforceable
provision that would control nitrogen pollution—
the nitrogen balance ratio target2. Instead, growers
now only need to report the total N applied. Even
with the 100% compliance rate of this mandate, the
total N reporting provides substantially less
information about which farms have nitrogen
surpluses and might be contributing to pollution.
Second, and arguably most importantly, the Ag
Waiver does not have any quantifiable mechanisms
to determine if management practices implemented
by Tier 1 and 2 farms reduce pollution (Monterey
Coastkeeper, et al. v. SWRCB 2015). Third, choosing
which management practices to implement is largely
up to the discretion of agricultural operators. The Ag
Waiver does not define what management practices
should be implemented or verify if those practices
are
actually
improving
water
(Monterey
Coastkeeper, et al. v. SWRCB 2015). Though
management practices are a means to reduce
pollution discharges and achieve water quality, the
California’s Nonpoint Source Policy establishes that
“management practices may not be substituted for
actual compliance with water quality standards”
(SWRCB 2004).

Agricultural nitrogen balance ratios can indicate
which farms are at risk to nitrogen pollution. The
ratio tracks the amount of nitrogen input to and
output from the farm, and calculates the potential
surplus of nitrogen on the farm. This surplus
nitrogen (the amount not used by crops) can runoff
or leach into nearby waterways, causing polluted.
The aim is to achieve a one-to-one input-to-output
ratio.

2
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One new requirement that can aid the Regional
Board in estimating improved water quality is the
mandate to report all water quality management
practices and outcomes. The online form requires
growers to check all nutrient, irrigation, pesticide
and sediment management practices that are being
implemented and the number of acres on which the
practices are applied. While this new tool will
provide baseline data for the Regional Board to
better understand how growers say they are
managing their land and crops, there are no means
to verify if those management practices are effective.
Growers have the opportunity to report if they have
seen a positive outcome from their implemented
management practices, yet outcomes are measured
by the grower’s perception of change rather than a
numeric or quantifiable water quality data. For
example, in the 2014 annual compliance form, the
most commonly used method to confirm sediment
reduction was by walking the perimeter of the
property to verify erosion controls were in place and
that sediment did not leave the ranch/farm during
irrigation events and/or storm events; the least
commonly used method to confirm sediment
reduction was to measure turbidity in stormwater
runoff.
Monitoring, will the data be meaningful?
The Agricultural Waiver has significant monitoring
limitations. In the 2012 Ag Waiver, the Regional
Board acknowledged that a critical limitation of the
2004 Ag Waiver was “the lack of discharge
monitoring and reporting... and the lack of public
transparency regarding on-farm discharges”
(CCRWQCB 2012). The 2015 Superior Court Judge
ruling reiterated this point: “The 2004 Waiver has
not been successful because it lacks adequate
standards and feedback mechanisms to assess the
effectiveness of implemented management practices
in reducing pollution and preventing further
degradation of water quality.” Despite adding a
handful of modest monitoring requirements to
contend with these limitations, the updated 2012 Ag
Waiver suffers from the same shortcomings as its
predecessor.
The biggest deficiency in the monitoring program is
that data collected are neither comprehensive
enough to verify the effectiveness of the
management practices nor to identify individual
operations that cause impairments (Monterey
Coastkeeper, et al. v. SWRCB 2015). This issue
JSPG. Vol. 8, Issue 1, February 2016
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points to the most controversial Ag Waiver topic:
public disclosure and transparency of information.
The most effective means of identifying a polluter is
to conduct individual discharge monitoring at the
edge of a discharger’s field where pollutants enter
the water. Because of its controversial nature, and
the difficulty to collect data from thousands of
individual farms, the 2012 Ag Waiver compromised
by mandating that only the highest risk polluters—
Tier 3 farms—need to report individual surface
discharge monitoring. The biggest fear among
growers is that of being identified as a point source
polluter, and subsequently regulated under WDRs or
NPDES permits, rather than a Waiver. As one
Regional Board staff member put it, growers “don’t
want to deal with a government agency managing
their land and water, and they don’t want to be
called part of the problem.”
With individual
discharge monitoring requirements as the driving
force, growers did anything they could to get out of
Tier 3. Farm operations split their ranches into subparcels, stopped using certain pesticides, or stopped
farming altogether. To depict the drastic exodus out
of Tier 3, in 2010, over 10% of farms were
categorized in Tier 3, yet as of September 2015, only
1% of all farms in the Region are regulated under
that Tier. As a result of the shift to lower tiers,
monitoring and regulatory provisions, and the
overall Ag Waiver itself, have been severely
hindered, since most growers are not held to
sufficiently strict mandates. A goal of requiring
individual surface water monitoring of Tier 3 farms
was to evaluate effects of waste discharge on water
quality and beneficial uses; it remains to be seen
whether data from such a small subset of growers
will adequately achieve this objective.
In contrast, the 99% of other growers (Tier 1 and 2)
must report surface receiving water monitoring,
either cooperatively or individually. Surface
receiving monitoring is conduced on the main stem
of a river, rather than near a grower’s fields. For
growers, this is a much more attractive scenario:
data is reported as an aggregate and pollutants
detected from surface receiving water data can
rarely be traced back to its source. Additionally, the
cost is generally less than the fees associated with
the individual surface water discharge Sampling and
Analysis Plan (SAP) and Quality Assurance Project
Plan (QAPP).
Monitoring challenges are exacerbated by the diffuse
nature of nonpoint source pollution. Because
www.sciencepolicyjournal.org
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agricultural runoff does not enter a stream at a welldefined point, and often occurs episodically
(Andreen 2004), continuous or targeted monitoring
(i.e., set on a monthly or seasonal basis) are needed
to evaluate the rapidly changing and dynamic local
environmental conditions. Growers and the
cooperative monitoring program are not required to
collect data at the same time or even during the
same rain event, making it difficult to compare
results and establish trends. A nonprofit, the Coastal
Watershed Council (CWC), has attempted to address
this problem by testing several water parameters in
watersheds throughout the region during the first
rain event, or “First Flush”, in their annual Snapshot
Day. By collecting water quality data during the first
rainfall, the CWC attempts to capture the most
concentrated pollutants washing off the landscape in
significant levels at the same time from year to year.
The CWC’s Snapshot Day found nutrients and
turbidity from agriculture and urban areas to be a
major source of regional water contamination.
However, the CWC program is volunteer-based and
has a limited capacity to carry out high quality
comprehensive monitoring.
Costs vs. Benefits
A related complaint by growers is that they will be
substantially harmed by the cost of compliance. A
2012 Ag Alert article reported that the regulatory
requirements in the 2012 Order amounted to more
than $230 million in lost revenue and an estimated
2,500 to 3,300 in lost agricultural jobs (Campbell
2012). The Growers-Shippers Association of Central
California added that the adopted regulations are
“over-board and intrusive on grower operations” (as
cited in Campbell 2012). Some growers claim that
the compliance costs are unwarranted because farm
management practices similar to the ones being
mandated are already in effect. A representative
from the Santa Cruz Farm Bureau voiced the
agricultural community’s frustrations, “in general,
there has been a lot of concern about the regulations
being applied. In particular, the Regional Board did
not take into consideration what was already being
done on the farm. [The Agricultural Waiver] adds a
financial and time burden on growers.”
Several growers and agricultural organizations,
including seven county Farm Bureaus, put into
writing the perceived economic burden in their
appeal to the 2012 Ag Order. In their request,
agricultural petitioners claimed the cost of
JSPG. Vol. 8, Issue 1, February 2016
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compliance would amount to 1.3-2.5%, 0.13-0.3%,
and 0.8-1.5 % of gross crop revenues per acre for
leaf lettuce, strawberry, and head lettuce,
respectively. Some asserted that the methods
employed in the agricultural group’s cost analysis
were “not credible” and the numbers were “inflated,”
and “self-serving” (Shimek 2012b). In its argument
against the agricultural industry’s estimated
compliance costs, the Regional Board claimed that
because the potential costs vary widely from farm to
farm it is impossible to estimate the range over all
farms. Another example of cost discrepancies was in
the estimated monitoring expenditures for the two
pesticides regulated in the Ag Waiver, diazinon and
chlorpyrifos: the Regional Board estimated the total
cost to monitor these two pesticides would be $250
per farm, whereas the agricultural petitioners
estimated $7,000 to $11,000 per farm.
It is nearly impossible to put a dollar value on the
public health and ecological benefits gained from the
two Agricultural Waivers, but it is worth mentioning
some potential benefits from the Ag Waiver. In their
rebuttal to the request for a “stay,” the Regional
Board listed several environmental benefits that
would result from the 2012 Agricultural Waiver
including improved drinking water, overall public
health, decreased pollutant loadings in surface and
groundwater, reduced threat to sensitive aquatic
habitats, and more stabilization of stream banks in
riparian areas. Whether these improved societal and
environmental conditions outweigh the estimated
0.8-2.5% of gross crop revenues it would cost to
comply will largely depend on who is asked.
Equity of Compliance and Distributional
Consequences
Issues of equity are at the heart of public policy
controversies (Stone 2002), and can be used to
measure policy effectiveness two ways: fairness
(even distribution of benefits) or redistribution
(channels costs disproportionately to those that lack
them or channels costs to the biggest hazards)
(Salamon 2002). A related distributive conflict
concerns communities disproportionately affected
by a given policy. Factors that may play a role in
measuring equity through the lens of environmental
justice include (1) the level of participation among
stakeholders and/or (2) distributive outcomes of
pollution (OTA 1995). These types of concerns
harken back to the founder of policy studies, Harold
Lasswell (1936), who encouraged policy scholars to
www.sciencepolicyjournal.org
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ask: “Who benefits? Who gets what, when, and how?”
Answers to such questions attempt to uncover the
inevitable unequal allocation of resources that result
the dynamic relationship of power and bargaining
inherent in the making of any set of rules and
regulations (Mahoney and Thelen 2010).
In the case of the Central Coast Ag Waiver, three
main distributional consequences of compliance
have been highlighted as unfair. The first two are
contestations among growers themselves. First, Tier
3 growers contend that the three-tiered system is
imbalanced because it distributes a substantially
higher burden on a small number of farms. This
assertion represents a classic policy paradox: “equal
treatment may require unequal treatment; and the
same distribution may be seen as equal or unequal,
depending on one’s point of view” (Stone 2002).
From the Regional Board’s perspective, requiring
more stringent and costly compliance standards for
higher-risk farms is more fair than holding all
regulated entities to the same standards. “If they are
rational,” argues Sunstein (1990), “agencies will
bring enforcement actions against the most
dangerous violator.”
Another group of growers feel the Agricultural
Waiver is unfair for a different set of reasons. This
agricultural group asserts that while they are
attempting to comply with the Waiver’s provision
(i.e., enrolling in the waiver, implementing BMPs,
paying an agency to monitor), other growers are
able to get away with non-compliance due to a lack
of enforcement. A farm advisor told a story of a San
Benito County farmer that was “jumping through all
the hoops to comply with the Agriculture waiver
regulations saying, ‘I’m paying to have my tailwaters
and wells tested, but how can I compete in the
marketplace if my neighbor’s polluted tailwaters
come through my farm and is not doing anything to
comply? I cannot ask the market to give me a higher
price for my crop to help offset the expenses.’” This
statement speaks directly to the uneven impacts
resulting from insufficient enforcement as well as
the tough political economic conditions under which
farmers are operating in the region.
The 2012 Ag Waiver attempts to address different
aspects of fairness in its regulatory requirements.
First, the Regional Board and staff acknowledged
that each farm is unique and requirements should
not be one-size-fits-all (see Transcript of
Proceedings 2011), which is why it devised a threetiered system that intentionally split farms by size
JSPG. Vol. 8, Issue 1, February 2016
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and risk to water quality. The Regional Board
received several comment letters from smaller
farms, perhaps like the one in the San Benito case,
who were concerned about requirements being
overly burdensome due to their size. Because of
these concerns and because smaller farms may (but
not definitely) pose a smaller risk to water quality,
they have been placed in Tier 1 with the least costly
and onerous requirements. There was also some
dialogue of creating an even lesser tier with no
requirements for those farms that have very
minimal discharges to act as an incentivize curtailing
pollution. However, a “Tier 0” would be the
equivalent of stopping pollution altogether, and in
such a case a farm would not have to apply for a
permit at all. For Tier 2 and 3 farms, the option of
transferring to a lower Tier does exist, however.
Additionally, governmental and third party agencies
have established programs to provide technical and
financial assistance to help growers achieve
compliance mandates. For example, Section 319 of
the U.S. Clean Water Act provides territories and
tribes with grants for nonpoint source pollution. In
2012, these grants provided $164.5 million for
pollution abatement projects throughout the
country (EPA 2012). Another department, The U.S.
Department of Agriculture Natural Resource
Conservation Services (USDA-NRCS), works closely
with landowners and growers to provide cost-share,
technical assistance, and economic incentives to
implement BMPs for water quality improvement.
The USDA’s Conservation Reserve Enhancement
Programs and the NRCS’s Environmental Quality
Incentives Program (EQIP) offer free consultation
and financial services to growers who implement
best management practices (BMPs) for water quality
protection. Nongovernmental agencies, such as the
Community Alliance for Family Farmers (CAFF),
offer similar assistance to growers, particularly
those in need of help financing and installing native
vegetative buffer strips, which in the early phases of
Ag Waiver negotiations was presented as a
particularly challenging hurdle for Tier 3 farms.
Consulting groups that aid in the implementation of
BMPs in California include the University of
California Cooperative Extension, academic and
research institutions, and growers’ consortia.
The concept of fairness and equity in regulations and
monitoring also exist between different groups of
stakeholders. In his opening remarks at a pivotal
regional board meeting concerning the 2011 draft
www.sciencepolicyjournal.org
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order (March 17, 2011), Assistant Executive Director
to the Regional Board, Michael Thomas, aptly
addressed this concept of fairness:
[Fairness] depends on who you are. If you’re a
farmer struggling to make a living today in this
environment of increasing regulations from multiple
agencies like ours, of if you are a fisherman…who’s
fishing in Oso Flaco Lake, that lake is now posted
because of contamination in fish tissue due to
pesticides, or if you’re a person who’s relying on
groundwater as a drinking water source, and that
water is contaminated, [that] picture can look very
different.
In his testimony, Mr. Thomas also added that
different sectors might perceive an unequal fairness
in how much they are being regulated. Urban
stormwater is regulated heavily because of its high
threat to water quality, yet timber and agriculture
are regulated the least, despite agriculture being the
primary source of water contamination in the region.
Municipalities in the area, such as the City of
Monterey (Meurer 2011), agree that the urban
sector incurs a higher degree of regulation and costs
of compliance than do its agricultural counterpart.
VIII. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
As runoff from crop fields continues to pollute
waters throughout the Central Coast, policymakers
are increasingly forced to tackle the monumental
task of how to best regulate agricultural discharges.
Several complicated factors either drive or constrain
improved water quality management and pollution
control. In California’s Central Coast, conditions that
have weakened agricultural water pollution policies
in the region include budgetary and staff constraints,
the 2006 E. coli breakout, and the powerful
agricultural
lobby.
On
the
other
side,
environmentalists, environmental justice groups,
health organizations, scientific studies, S.B. 390, and
the 2015 California Superior Court ruling have
pushed the Regional Board to develop more
comprehensive water quality protections.
The 2004 and 2012 Central Coast Agricultural
Waiver made incremental pollution protections.
Both Waivers represent a significant step forward in
the way society thinks about and growers manage
discharges from agriculture. As one farm advisor
explained, “the Agricultural Waiver was a success
because it is a move in the right direction. Everyone
in the research and extension community is trying to
better understand nutrient management, which is a
JSPG. Vol. 8, Issue 1, February 2016
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good thing... And it will inevitably impact growers’
approach to [fertilizer] inputs in the future,
including cover cropping and nutrient management
plans.” Though best management practices may be
better understood as a result of the Ag Waiver, water
quality has still not improved as a result.
A top priority of the Regional Board should be to
develop strategies for increasing adoption of
effective management practices and evaluating their
success through numeric water quality monitoring.
No panacea exists to magically improve water
quality in a short timeframe, except for barring
agricultural operations altogether, which is
politically, culturally and economically unfeasible.
Rather, the Regional Board must use a diversified
toolset, one that includes the implementation of
science-driven best management practices to control
pollution at its source.
A number of policy tools have successfully regulated
pollutant inputs, such as the Dirty Input Limit (see
Driesen and Sinden 2009) and the Netherland’s
Nitrate Tax (see Mayzelle and Harter 2011). The
Dirty Input Limits (DIL) approach departs from
conventional environmental regulation since its
focus is on inputs, or sources of pollutants.
Traditionally, environmental regulation focuses on
outputs, using control mechanisms (e.g., taxes,
tradable permits, effluent limits) to abate pollution
at the end-of-the-pipe. Most of the provisions in the
Agricultural Waiver are cases in point—by
monitoring ground and surface water and
mandating certain BMPs in an attempt to control
fertilizer runoff after they have been applied (i.e.,
buffer zones), the Agricultural Waiver’s regulatory
tools focus on output, rather than input limits. The
provision that most resembled DIL approach was
the nitrate balance ratio, but as mentioned
previously, the State Board eliminated this mandate
in its modifications to the 2012 Agricultural Waiver.
In addition to nitrate balance ratios, which targets
farmers use of fertilizers, the DIL approach also
targets sources of contaminants further upstream.
For example, manufacturers of pollutants such as
fertilizers or pesticides might be required to cap
their production, creating a ripple effect through the
whole production stream. In theory, this type of tool
could be highly effective in reducing the amount of
fertilizers produced, sold, bought, applied and
discharged into waterbodies. As suggested by
Driesen and Sinden (2009), this approach is useful
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beyond the tool choice in that it provokes a new way
of thinking about environmental regulation.
This approach has been successfully implemented in
the Netherland’s as a nitrate tax, directly targeting
inputs. In an attempt to decrease fertilizer use, the
Netherland’s federal government implemented a
hefty penalty (seven times the cost of fertilizer at the
time) on excess input of nitrogen (Harter et al.,
2012). The policy proved to be remarkably effective
in achieving its intended objective—one monitoring
study showed that nitrogen surpluses in agricultural
areas fell substantially as a result of its
implementation (as cited in Harter et al. 2012). In
this case, the federal government had broad
authority to impose a highly coercive tool. Coercive
tools are likely to be more effective, and yield
redistributive results (Salamon 2002); however,
they are also the least politically feasible and
popular because costs fall most heavily on regulated
entities.
Given the severity of the water pollution problem on
the one hand, and the tumultuous socio and political
economic conditions under which regional water
quality policies are made on the other, the Central
Coast Regional Board has no easy task. The Regional
Board and its staff should be lauded for its efforts,
but with water quality deteriorating it is clear that
the current provisions do not go far enough. The
three-tiered system was, in theory, a step towards
more equity and fairness, increasing regulatory
mandates for the most serious polluters. But the
ease at which farmers have escaped Tier 3—the Tier
with the most valuable individual monitoring data—
begs the question of whether the tiered structured
was effective. Compliance requirements include
reporting implemented water quality best
management practices, however this system
amounts to little more than a mere checklist. When
agricultural operators themselves, not third parties
or Regional Board staff, are the ones verifying the
implementation
and
effectiveness
of
best
management practices, it is difficult to discern the
actual outcomes of on-farm implementation
techniques. A more comprehensive monitoring and
reporting program is needed to not only verify the
effectiveness of implemented management practices
but also to use as a baseline for calculating pollution
loads and meet TMDLs and water quality standards.
The Regional Board might look to California
Department of Pesticide Regulation’s successful data
collection system to use as a model. Finally, it is in
JSPG. Vol. 8, Issue 1, February 2016
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the Regional Board’s interest to continue to foster
participation and cooperation with the regulated
industry, since growers are ultimately the ones
implementing on-farm water quality protections.
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